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Abstract 
This paper empirically analyse the effects of large changes in infrastructure on plant-level 
performance in Norway. More specifically, the construction of new tunnels and bridges. The 
results of this thesis is relevant because increased performance at plant-level stimulates 
economic growth. 
I compute an econometric analysis on plant-level data from Norwegian firms during 2003 – 
2011. The main analysis investigates the effect on return on assets from the opening of new 
road projects that opening in 2006 – 2008, and projects opening in 2008. I also present a similar 
analysis on the effect on employees. When I look at the entire period I cannot conclude that 
the opening of new projects have an effect on return on assets and employees. However, I find 
that return on assets increases with 11.4 % and employees increases with 6.2 when I only use 
tunnels and bridges that opens in 2008. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A thoroughly studied area in financial literature is theory about agency problems and corporate 
governance. Important aspects within this theory is mechanisms of monitoring and 
information acquiring. Studies that are more recent investigate the effect of proximity as an 
extension of these mechanisms. Findings from studies on mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz, 
1999; 2001) and venture capitalists (Lerner, 1995) show strong relationships between 
proximity and the ability to monitor an acquire information. In a more recent study, Giroud 
(2012) finds a strong effect on plant-level performance because of improvements in proximity 
between headquarters and plants. However, little information exists on how improvements in 
proximity affects firms at plant-level in Norway. 
Improvements in proximity can come from the introduction of new airline routes, boat 
connections, railways or changes in road networks. The biggest and most frequent 
improvements in proximity in Norway are from the construction of road projects.  
Norwegian infrastructure is continuously developing and substantial amounts of money is 
used. Despite the resources allocated to maintain roads, are roads in Norway considered to be 
amongst the worst in Europe (Kjølleberg and Ansari, 2014) because of lag in maintenance 
(Seehusen, 2013). Simultaneously, Norwegian engineers is amongst the best in the world 
regarding road constructions. The special geography in Norway offer challenges, resulting in 
special expertise in building of tunnels and bridges (Kjølleberg and Ansari, 2014). This makes 
using large infrastructure projects in Norway, as an improvement in proximity, interesting. 
1.2 Focus and Demarcation 
This thesis origin from a similar research by Giroud (2012) on plant-level data in the United 
States. Giroud’s (2012) method constitutes the basis for my analysis. A strength in this method 
is the use of reduction in travel time as a plausible exogenous variable. This takes care of the 
endogenous problem associated with physical distance. Similarly, I use changes in 
infrastructure as an exogenous variable in my analysis on plant-level data in Norway. 
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I investigate the effect of changes in infrastructure on plant-level performance and employees. 
Financial theory includes numerous measures of financial performance. However, I focus only 
on one, return on assets. The Norwegian Corporate Account provides me with data containing 
financial information on companies in Norway. It also puts a constraint on the period I include 
in my analysis. Furthermore, I focus only on industries ranging from A to F in the NACE 
codes, as they have similar characteristics. Providing me with a broader specter of industries 
compared to Giroud’s (2012) study that only focused on manufacturing industry. 
The Norwegian infrastructure is suffering and the government is granting substantial resources 
to improvements and developments. The outcome is several large changes in infrastructure 
over time. Continuous developments in infrastructure is why I choose to use reduction in travel 
time due to road projects as an exogenous variable.  
1.3 Research Question 
I test the hypothesis first presented by Giroud (2012), to see if it applies to firms in Norway. 
In which openings of new tunnels and bridges constitute improvements in proximity. 
Moreover, I investigate if profitability and employees increases as it becomes easier for 
headquarters to visit plants. As an increase in traveling is likely to increase monitoring and 
information acquiring on plants. 
Consequently, I raise the following research question: 
How does a reduction in travel time between headquarter and plant improve plant 
management? 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
In section 2, I provide a theoretical framework including theory about agency problems and 
corporate governance mechanisms. The focus is however on the presentation of previous 
research to give a better understanding of the background for my thesis. Section 3 gives a 
thoroughly presentation of the empirical strategy including construction of the dataset and 
econometric issues. Section 4 contains findings of the main analysis. I provide a discussion of 
the result and present a sensitivity analysis. Finally, I sum up and conclude upon my findings 
in section 5. 
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2 Related Literature 
This section opens with an introduction of corporate governance and agency theory. I follow 
up with an explanation of how they relate to proximity and why it is important. Finally, I turn 
my attention towards previous empirical studies concerning proximity in different 
applications. My main focus is on Giroud’s (2012) study of plant-level performance in the 
United States. 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
When a corporation separates ownership and control, conflicts of interests often arises. 
Corporate governance is an attempt to minimize such conflicts (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011). It 
constitutes a set of mechanisms to protect investors’ interests against potential 
mismanagement. A successful implementation of corporate governance creates value for both 
corporations and society. Society benefit from economic growth through investments in 
projects that creates value. Whilst corporations profit from aligned interests between the 
principal, provider of financial capital, and the agent, contributor of human capital. More 
specifically, with aligned interests the agent benefits from resources and trust from the 
principal, and the principal gain higher returns. In contrast, misaligned interests destroy value. 
A method to govern agents is monitoring (Berk and DeMarzo). The principal learns about the 
plant’s daily business through monitoring, and becomes more confident to allocate assets. A 
problem arises if the principal becomes overconfident, this can destroy value instead of 
creating it. Improvements in proximity encourage more active monitoring, which strengthens 
supervision. Consequently, proximity facilitates monitoring and access to information 
(Giroud, 2012). 
2.2 Agency Problem 
Agency problem is the conflict between the principal and the agent. The principal owns assets 
and provides financial capital (headquarter). The agent is the management responsible for the 
company’s daily operations and manages the invested resources (plants management). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract between one person that 
engages another person to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
decision-making authority. 
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Agency problems arise because contracts are not free from problems (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). If principals and agents objectives and incentives are different, then the agent may not 
act in the principal’s best interest, and a potential agency conflict arises between them. Another 
problem with agency is the presence of asymmetric information. An example is agents 
possessing company-specific information, due to involvements in the daily business, of which 
the principal has no knowledge. Conflicts also arises from an agent being reluctant to take on 
new projects that creates value, because he has concerns about how undertaking more risk 
reflects upon him. 
Headquarters allocate investments and budget resources to plants, and monitor in effort to 
avoid agency problems (Giroud, 2012). Improvements in proximity makes it easier for 
headquarters to travel more and develop better insights in plants operations, which reduces 
agency conflicts. Frequently monitoring may induce motivation amongst plant managers and 
workers to improve the plant’s performance (Giroud, 2012). 
2.3 Proximity in Plant-level Data 
Until recently, little research has been done on how improvements in proximity affects firms 
at plant-level. In a very thorough study, Giroud (2012) finds a positive effect in headquarters 
plant-level investment and plants productivity due to reduction in travel time because of the 
introduction of new airline routes. He finds that headquarters are more likely to invest in plants 
that are located closer to headquarters, and that proximity to headquarters improve plant-level 
productivity. 
Location is important to establish improvements in proximity. A concern is that location of 
both headquarters and plants are made by choice, hence proximity is likely to be endogenous. 
Making it problematic to establish causality. Previous empirical studies measures proximity 
in physical distance as a proxy for the ease of monitoring and acquiring information. To 
remove endogeneity, Giroud (2012) suggests using travel time as it entails plausible 
exogenous variation. However, a limitation of this approach is that it relies on variation in 
travel time, not in monitoring or access to information. Further, Giroud (2012) argues that it 
is plausible that travel time reduction leads to an improvement in monitoring and information 
acquisition, and thus improves the plants performance. Moreover, that larger reductions in 
travel time results in stronger effects of treatment. 
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Giroud (2012) combines plant-level data with airline data, in which he exploits the 
introduction of new airline routes that reduces travel time between headquarters and plants, as 
a source of exogenous variation. He then applies difference-in-differences approach to 
examine the effect on plant-level investment and productivity. In this approach, Giroud (2012) 
uses a treatment window of equal length both prior to and after treatment. A treatment window 
compares performance several years before and after treatment providing a better picture of 
the change due to the treatment. To account for the possibility of other factors that may affect 
firms behavior to increase return on investment, a control group is included that consists of all 
plants not yet treated. 
A strength in the empirical design of Giroud’s (2012) model is that it accounts for the fact that 
reduction in travel time can vary for other reasons, such as new roads, changes in speed limit 
and expansion of railroad networks. Plants affected by such changes are included in the control 
group, and if these sources of travel time reductions lead to increased performance then the 
result understate the true effect of travel time reduction. 
An important assumption is that managers make optimal decisions. Hence, they choose the 
route and transportation that minimizes travel time between headquarters and plants. This 
implies that the distance between treated plants and headquarters need to be appropriate so 
that the optimal transportation is the transportation method included in treatment. Moreover, 
as treatment depends on time reduction as of new commercial airline routes in Giroud’s (2012) 
study. It ensures that the registered effect is a result of increased personal transport, managers 
traveling more frequently, and not increased cargo transport, e.g. shipping of equipment or 
products. 
Moreover, reasons for changes in infrastructure can depend on several factors. As long as these 
factors are unrelated to plant-level performance this constitute no concern. However, if these 
factors drive both the change in infrastructure and plant-level performance, any relationship 
between them might be forged (Giroud, 2012). 
If a change in infrastructure improves headquarters ability to monitor and acquire information 
about plants, this may be reflected in plants performance. A plant that is easier to monitor is 
less likely to have private information, and may receive more investments from its 
headquarter. If monitoring increases, it can improve plant managers’ incentives to be more 
aligned with headquarters incentives. It also allows headquarters to learn more about the plant, 
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which can improve plants productivity (Giroud, 2012). However, there is also a down side 
with improved monitoring. Headquarters can become “too well informed” or “monitors too 
much” (Giroud, 2012). Consequently, this can impair plant managers’ incentives to create new 
investment opportunities or work hard.  
If symmetric information exists, everyone have the same knowledge, and no agency problem 
is present then a change in travel time might not matter as there are no need to monitor more 
frequently to learn more or discipline. 
Giroud (2012) argues that increased productivity not necessarily implies that the company is 
better off. Even though traveling become easier for headquarters, more frequent monitoring 
might not add value even if they believe it does. If this is the case, they might draw comfort 
from their added involvement and invest more in the plant. Hence, the plant receives more 
investments and becomes more productive. Especially if the difference between the plant and 
plants who originally received most investments are large, due to financial constraints in the 
firm. In this situation, the rest of the firm is likely to suffer because of inefficient reallocation 
of resources based on a mistake.  
2.4 Previous Research 
2.4.1 Evidence from Mutual Funds 
It is well known that investors tend to be home biased, investing more in their home country 
instead of investing internationally and diversifying risk away. Moreover, the bias often extent 
towards local firms as well (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; 2001). Investors’ preference for 
locally headquartered firms are a result of easier access to information. Implying existence of 
asymmetric information in the market, driving investors to prefer proximate investments 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999).  
Local investors have many advantages compared to outside investors when acquiring 
information about firms. Being proximate to a firm, they can contact associates, retrieve 
important information through local media and similar channels (Coval and Moskowitz, 
1999). This proves the importance of and advantages with proximity. 
Fund managers appear to earn substantial abnormal returns on local investments (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 2001). Suggesting a strong geographical connection between mutual fund 
investment and performance. Local mutual funds have improved monitoring capabilities or 
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access to private information of geographical proximate firms (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). 
Accordingly, funds that are more superior in exploiting local knowledge, profit more from 
these investments. Areas that for some reason are more difficult for outsiders to obtain local 
information about, offer larger profit for local investors (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). 
2.4.2 Evidence from Venture Capitalists 
Venture capital organizations provide equity to young start-up firms unqualified for external 
funds. These organizations take on substantial risk by investing in young firms. However, the 
potential upside is large. Venture capitalists depend on having detailed knowledge of firms 
they finance to control risk. Hence, closely monitoring is important to limit opportunistic 
behavior (Lerner, 1995).  
Venture capitalists take substantial roles in firms they are financing. They often become board 
members, visit frequently, and meet with both customers and suppliers. Further, they also have 
an active involvement in key personnel and strategic decisions (Lerner, 1995). Monitoring of 
this extension results in extensive transaction costs. 
Proximity to firms reduces transaction costs associated with frequent visits and intensive 
involvement (Lerner, 1995). Accordingly, geographic proximity is an important determination 
of venture board membership. More proximate firms, to the office of venture capitalists, are 
more likely to have board members compared to more distance firms (Lerner, 1995). 
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3 Empirical Strategy 
I now explain my empirical strategy. First, I present my dataset and its sources, and provide 
an explanation of assumptions and adjustments. Then the focus shifts towards variables and 
calculations of plant-level profitability. Finally, I describe technicalities and outline empirical 
issues before I present my regression analysis. 
3.1 Construction of Dataset 
3.1.1 Plant-level Data 
The Norwegian Corporate Account provides me with data on plants and headquarters. The 
database contains financial statements and descriptive information from companies in Norway 
throughout the years of 1992 to 2011. Financial statements consist of income statements and 
balance sheets, for both groups and individual for each company.  Key variables are net income 
and total assets, which I use to calculate plant level profitability. The descriptive information 
contains knowledge about a firm being active, postal codes, number of employees, industry 
code and headquarters organization number. Organization numbers identify both plants and 
headquarters. I use these to connect plants with their respective headquarter. 
A problem with the Norwegian Corporate Account is missing values amongst key variables in 
my dataset, especially in early years. Missing values put a constraint on my sampling period. 
Prior to 1997 are there no registrations of postal codes. Headquarters organization number are 
missing before 2002, and there are no recordings of a firm being active until 2003. All three 
variables are important in constructing my dataset, limiting me to include only nine years of 
plant-level observations from 2003 through 2011. 
Another issue is missing registrations on employees in 2006 and 2007. Both years are critical 
to my dataset and my regression analysis. Nevertheless, I assume that the number of 
employees does not change rapidly. A solution is using data on employees from 2005 for 2006 
and from 2008 for 2007. Combining this approximation with information on a plant being 
active, allow me to keep these years within my sample. It is important to recognize this as a 
weakness in my analysis that can affect my findings. Particularly the effect from openings of 
new road projects on employees. 
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For a plant to be included in my sample I require that the plant  
- is active at least for two years within 2003 – 2011. 
- has minimum one employee in a plant-year observation. 
- has at least one year prior to treatment and one year after treatment.  
The latter requirement provide some degree of symmetry in my dataset and remove firms that 
opens after the road project opens. This is important, as I am interesting in the difference 
before and after in already existing plants. 
I also remove plant-year observations that have missing values in postal codes, net income, 
total assets, or industry code. Subsequently the dataset consists of several plant observations 
not listed throughout the entire period. Making it an unbalanced panel dataset (Wooldridge, 
2009). However, this constitute no concern and do not affect the empirical method. 
Similar requirements apply for headquarters. More specifically, I require that a plant’s 
headquarter is active and have minimum one employee. I exclude headquarter-year 
observations not fulfilling these requirements from my sample. Additionally, they must also 
have postal code, this being the most important information about headquarters.  
The Norwegian Corporate Account database includes yearly observations of both plants and 
headquarters within the same column. I remove headquarter observations from the dataset to 
ensure that the effect I find is only from plant-level profitability and employees. Furthermore, 
I assign all key information concerning headquarters to the respective plant-level observation 
that matches year and headquarters organization number. This is important, as I am only 
interesting in plant-level profitability and employees. 
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Table 3-1: Descriptive statistics. 
 
After removing all plants not fulfilling my requirements, I have 30131 plant-year observations. 
This corresponds to 5764 plants with an average of 5.2 plant-year observations. The substantial 
difference in observations between the control group and the treatment group comes from an 
extensive fraction of single unit firms. These firms consist of a single establishment having 
headquarter and plant at the same location. Hence, they can never have a treatment so they are 
included in the control group.  
My sample only contains nine years of data because of missing registrations. Accordingly, I 
can maximum have a treatment window of four years before and after a treatment. 
Unfortunately, not many infrastructure projects opens in 2007. I therefore chose to use a three-
year window before and after treatment. Giving me a sample period on tunnels and bridges 
from 2006 to 2008. However, there is a tradeoff between choosing to reduce the number of 
years before and after treatment and having a larger group of changes in infrastructure. 
Including more years before and after treatment, reduces any impact of extreme values. On 
the other hand, a larger sample of road projects give a more representative result for Norway 
in general. 
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3.1.2 Tunnel and Bridge Data 
I collect information about tunnels and bridges from Vegdirektoratet. They provide me with a 
information on of road projects including name, opening year, location, length and what they 
replaced. Tunnels and bridges opening during 2006 – 2008 are included in my sample. See 
appendix 1 for the list of tunnels and bridges. 
Figure 3-1:Map of road projects. 
 
Road projects open at different times during a year, and this can potentially induce problems. 
If a project opens in the beginning of a year one can include that year as after, whilst for 
projects opening at the end of a year one can include that year as before. However, if a project 
opens in the middle of a year then there is no easy solution on whether to treat that year as 
before or after. To provide consistency and avoid this problem, I exclude the year when a 
project opens from my dataset. 
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3.1.3 Postal Codes 
I use postal codes to connect data on road projects with plant-level data from the Norwegian 
Corporate Account database. A combining usage of Google Maps and Bring (2014 b) provide 
me with relevant postal codes. Bring (2014 a) also equip me with a map of Norway including 
postal code boundaries. Collecting postal codes on either side of the road project define two 
areas so that the optimal travel route is via the project. A natural assumption in my model is 
that the optimal travel route has the lowest travel time. 
A concern when defining areas from postal codes, is addresses in the outer part of an area 
having another optimal route. This is highly dependent on the traveler’s starting point and 
destination. Nonetheless, I assume these are few, if any, and constitute no threat. On the other 
hand, another optimal travel route can reduce the impact on profitability understating my 
result. Not utilizing changes in infrastructure means no reduction in travel time and hence no 
incentives to travel more often. Moreover, a different combination of postal codes may give a 
different result and also increase plant-year observations, or reduce. Similar with treatments. 
The Norwegian Corporate Account database contains postal codes on both the actual location 
of the operation and the business address. No registrations on postal codes of operations prior 
to 2010, forces me to use postal codes of plants’ business addresses. However, the two groups 
of postal codes do not necessarily share the same address. I assume that any difference is 
insignificant and do not affect my results. 
3.2 Determining Variables 
3.2.1 Industry Sectors 
My sampling period contains two different classifications of industry codes, SN2002 and 
SN2007. The introduction of the latter replaces the initial classification in 2007. However, my 
dataset includes both classifications for the entire sampling period.  
I focus on industry sectors ranging from A to F in SN2007/NACE.  These industries constitute 
the primary industry, oil, gas and mining industry, energy, manufacturing, and construction 
(Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2014; European Commision, 2012). See appendix 2 for more details 
about industry sectors and classifications. I that plants are within sectors A to F in both 
classifications to be included in my dataset. 
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Figure 3-2: Distribution in industry sectors of year plant-level observations, 
2003 – 2011. 
 
(Norwegian Corporate Account)  
A noteworthy observation is that construction includes the industry of building tunnels and 
bridges. A concern in my analysis is that the effect on plant-level profitability from road 
projects can derive from the construction companies building them. 
3.2.2 Postal Code Areas 
I determine the effect from changes in infrastructure on plant-level performance from travel 
time reduction between two areas. See appendix 3 for a list of areas. The areas constitute 
collections of postal codes. I try to include a more densely populated town or village, when 
possible. A focus is on keeping travel time reasonable avoiding unrealistically long distances. 
Large travel distances absorb the impact from travel time reduction, requiring a more sufficient 
travel time reduction. Moreover, longer travel distances also increases the probability for being 
several other changes in infrastructure, not involving a project within my sample. This can 
have an impact on plant-level profitability.  
I assume that managers choose the travel route that minimizes travel time. Accordingly, travel 
time is the only factor in consideration when determining areas. Implying that the route with 
the shortest travel time not necessarily has shortest distance (km). A challenge with roads is 
the opportunity to choose between several alternative routes between two locations. 
Fortunately, one area is often easier to determine because of natural boundaries, i.e. an island 
or a headland. I exploit this area to determine the optimal route to the area on the opposite side 
of the project.  
4,20 % 2,12 %
1,93 %
38,72 %53,03 %
Primary industry
Oil, Gas & Mining industry
Energy
Manufacturing industry
Construction
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Combining resources from Bring (2014 a) and Google Maps give the fastest route through a 
project. My focus is on finding the outer limits, as the outer limits of one area determine the 
width of the other area so the optimal travel route is via the project. This approach also 
determines the length of an area if another route with a better travel time exists.  
Limiting the areas are the difficult part. Factors to consider are travel time, borders to a 
different area, and population density. Travel time is most important as it is unlikely that 
managers drive for several hours to visit a plant. Alternative transportation venues as airports, 
train stations or boat terminals is not a consideration in my model. However if they provide a 
shorter travel time then management uses alternative transportation. Consequently, it reduces 
the effect on plant-level profitability from road projects. Not utilizing the change in 
infrastructure means no changes in travel time, which reduces the likelihood of changes in 
monitoring habits. Other changes in infrastructure, including alternative transportation, 
resulting in travel time reduction, are included in the control group. The presence of these 
understate the effect on profitability from projects in my sample. 
3.3 Calculating Profitability 
3.3.1 Return On Assets (ROA) 
The plant’s profitability determines the effect from travel time reduction. I use return on assets 
(ROA) which measures both the operating and investing performance of a firm. ROA consists 
of two parts, net profit margin and asset turnover (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011). Hence, ROA 
show firms profitability relative to its assets. An increase in ROA indicates that a firm makes 
the best possible use of its assets to generate profits. I calculate ROA as: 
3–1 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
(Berk and DeMarzo, 2011) 
The nominator is from the income statement and the denominator is from the balance sheet. 
In the denominator, I use average over the year compounding the opening balance and closing 
balance (Damodaran, 2012), in which a year’s opening balance is the closing balance the year 
before. To avoid reducing my sample period I include balance sheet data from 2002 into my 
sample. 
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A problem with ROA occurs if a plant have substantial current assets, which understates the 
profitability of the plant (Damodaran, 2012). 
3.3.2 Differences-in-Differences 
I use Differences-in-Differences as an approach to calculate the causal effect of changes in 
infrastructure since my dataset include the same plants before and after a treatment. The 
approach works by separating data into two groups, one group of observations with treatment 
and one control group consisting of all observations not having a treatment. Then it calculates 
the difference before and after for the treatment group, and the difference before and after for 
the control group. Subtracting these differences reveal the effect of treatment. (Stock and 
Watson, 2003). 
In my sample, a treatment represents the opening of a new tunnel or a bridge between two 
areas. To have a treatment I require that a plant is located in one area and the respective 
headquarter is positioned in the other area, one on each side of a specific project. If a plant or 
headquarter is placed in one area but have no counterpart in the other area connected through 
the project, then they are in the control group. Plants remain in the control group until they are 
treated, hence some plants is never treated (Giroud, 2012). 
There are two methods to estimate the effect of treatment: 
1. Compute the differences in averages between the treatment and control group in each 
time period, and difference the results over time 
3–2 
?̂? = (?̅?𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − ?̅?𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) − (?̅?𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − ?̅?𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) 
2. Compute the changes in averages over time for each of the treatment and control 
groups and difference these changes 
3–3 
?̂? = (?̅?𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − ?̅?𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) − (?̅?𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 − ?̅?𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) 
The estimate of ?̂? is not depending on how I do the differencing (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Nevertheless, I use the latter approach.  
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Specifically, I compare the difference in profitability at plants before and after the year of 
treatment with the difference in profitability at control plants before and after the year of 
treatment. The difference-in-differences estimator: 
3–4 
𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = [𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,   𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,   𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒] 
 −[𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,   𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,   𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒] 
The difference between the two differences is the estimated effect on plant-level profitability 
of opening a new road project between headquarter and plant (Giroud, 2012). Using 
difference-in-differences approach I remove the impact from all other sources except the effect 
on ROA from the project, 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, which is the factor of interest. 
Table 3-2: Illustration of difference-in-differences. 
 Before After After – Before 
Control 𝛽0 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  
Treatment 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
Treatment - Control 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
(Wooldridge, 2009) 
A problem with a difference-in-differences analysis is the possibility for more than one 
treatment. More specifically, another project opening in the three years before or after my 
treatment can have an effect on my results. This can bias my result. If it happens before my 
treatment, it absorbs and reduces the effect of my project, and after it increases the effect. 
3.4 Econometric Issues 
To ensure a reliable result I need to consider relevant econometric issues before implementing 
my regression model. Ignoring these issues can bias my result and overestimate test statistics 
giving a false significant result. 
 25 
3.4.1 Fixed Effects Estimation (FE) 
Panel data often has correlation between an unobserved effect and the explanatory variables, 
𝑋𝑗,𝑖𝑡. If I believe that such correlation exist, I need to include fixed effects into the regression 
model (Wooldridge, 2009). The fixed effect estimator allows for arbitrary correlation between, 
𝛼𝑖, and the explanatory variables in any period, and accordingly, remove any explanatory 
variables remaining constant over time. Hence, datasets whose key variables remains constant 
over time should not use fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Including fixed effects into a regression allow controlling for variables that varies across 
entities but not changing over time in addition to variables that are constant across entities but 
evolves over time (Stock and Watson, 2003). 
Fixed effects varying across entities (firm-fixed effects) have n different intercepts, one for 
each entity. Representing these are a set of binary (or indicator) variables, that absorb the 
influence of all omitted variables that differ from one entity to the next, but are constant over 
time (Stock and Watson, 2003). Converting into a formula, the regression model is as follows: 
3–5 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
In which 𝑍𝑖 is the unobserved variable that varies from one entity to the next but does not 
change over time. The entity-specific intercept is: 
3–6 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖 
Combining these give the fixed effect regression model: 
3–7 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(Stock and Watson, 2003) 
Time fixed effects (year-fixed effects) controls for variables that are constant across entities 
but changes over time. To include time fixed effect into a regression model I use a binary 
variable that indicates different years. The regression model including time fixed effects is: 
3–8 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐵2𝑡 + ⋯ +  𝛿𝑇𝐵𝑇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
In which 𝑇𝑡 is a binary variable indicating different years, and 𝐵2𝑡 is a dummy variable that 
equals one if it is the second period and zero otherwise (Stock and Watson, 2003). 
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Fixed effects remove the effect of non-normal events that might have taken place during a year 
or at a plant (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). 
3.4.2 Random Effects Model (RE) 
The random effects model include all the fixed assumptions, in addition it also requires that 
the unobserved variable is independent of all explanatory variables in all periods. If I believe 
that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables, I should apply 
random effects (Wooldridge, 2009).  
3–9 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑗,𝑖𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖) = 0,         𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇; 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑘 
Removing the uncorrelated unobserved effect makes the estimators inefficient. Not 
eliminating the unobserved effect introduces serial correlation in the error term when using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), and bias standard errors and test statistics. Causing potential 
false significant results. As a solution, Wooldridge (2009) suggests using generalized least 
squares (GLS) instead of OLS, as occurrence of serial correlation has no impact on GLS. 
3.4.3 Fixed Effects or Random Effects 
Using fixed effects or random effects depends on the explanatory variables and beliefs 
concerning correlation with the unobserved effect. An important factor to keep in mind is if 
key explanatory variables are constant across time. Then the use of fixed effects eliminate its 
effect on the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡. It is important to determine which of these to include 
into the regression model, the wrong effects can give false significant results. 
I solve this by conducting the Hausman test. If FE = RE, there is no difference between the 
estimate done with FE and RE. In this case, random effects are appropriate to use. However, 
a sufficiently large difference between FE and RE implies using fixed effects (Wooldridge, 
2009).  
I believe that my explanatory variables correlate with the unobserved effect since I am 
comparing data before and after an event. In addition, the Hausman test reveal a sufficiently 
large difference between FE and RE estimates in my dataset confirming that my explanatory 
variables correlate with the unobserved effect. Consequently, I use fixed effects in my 
regression model. 
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3.4.4 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the regression line. The OLS estimator chooses 
the regression coefficients, 𝛽𝑗, so that the estimated regression line is as close as possible to 
the observed data. The distance to the observed data is calculated from the sum of squared 
mistakes made in predicting the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, given the explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
(Stock and Watson, 2003). 
OLS standard errors are vulnerable, they are easily biased, and often over- or underestimate 
standard deviation of coefficient estimates. Nevertheless, standard errors estimated by OLS 
are correct and unbiased as long as there are no fixed effects in the residual and the independent 
variable (Petersen, 2008). OLS also removes serial correlation in the error term that can lead 
to understated standard errors and give a false significant result (Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan, 2004) 
Heteroskedasticity 
It is important to control for heteroskedasticity when using OLS. Heteroskedasticity is when 
the error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, is not constant (Stock and Watson, 2003). For simple OLS analysis to be 
valid the error terms need to be constant, the presence of homoscedasticity (Wooldridge, 
2009). If not, I need to adjust for this in my regression model. Otherwise, the OLS is both 
inefficient and biased. 
To test for heteroskedasticity I use the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (Breusch and 
Pagan 1979). If the test shows constant error terms, I have homoscedasticity present in my 
dataset and no further correction to the OLS is necessary. On the other hand, if the test shows 
that the error terms are not constant I have heteroskedasticity in my dataset and I need to 
include clustered robust standard errors into my regression model (Petersen, 2008). The 
Breusch-Pagan test confirms the presence of heteroskedasticity in my dataset. 
Serial Correlation 
Another important concern, deriving from using difference-in-differences estimations, is serial 
correlation of the error terms (Giroud, 2012). Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) list 
three factors that make serial correlation an especially important issue when using difference-
in-differences estimation: 
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1. It often relies on long time series. 
2. Dependent variables most commonly used in difference-in-differences estimation are 
serial correlated. 
3. The treatment variable changes very little within a state over time. 
Further Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) emphasizes that these factors reinforce each 
other. Hence the standard errors of the estimated treatment effect, ?̂?, can severely understate 
its standard deviation and overestimate the  test statistics. Clustering standard errors in the 
regression model addresses any problems with serial correlation. 
Robust Standard Errors, Clustering 
To produce unbiased estimates I use clustered standard errors. Clustered standard errors 
account for dependence common in data from panel datasets. In other words, robust standard 
errors estimated using clustering, is close to the true standard error (Petersen, 2008). Moreover, 
clustered standard errors are unbiased, as they account for residual dependence created by 
fixed effects, and they are robust to heteroskedasticity (Petersen, 2008). Clustered standard 
errors also correct for the presence of serial correlation within the same plant as well as 
correlation of the error terms across plants in the same area code in any given year and over 
time (Giroud, 2012). 
Clustered standard errors are estimated with a variance-covariance matrix that is consistent in 
presence of any correlation pattern within areas over time (Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan, 
2004). Using a generalized White-like formula to compute clustered standard errors, the 
estimator for the variance-covariance matrix becomes: 
3–10 
𝑊 = (𝑉′𝑉)−1 (∑ 𝑢𝑗′𝑢𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
) (𝑉′𝑉)−1 
In which 𝑁 is the total number of states, 𝑉 is the matrix of independent variables (year 
dummies, state dummies and treatment dummy) and 𝑢𝑗  is defined for each state to be: 
𝑢𝑗 = ∑ 𝑒𝑗𝑡𝑣𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
In which 𝑒𝑗𝑡 is the estimated residual for state 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝑣𝑗𝑡 is a row vector of dependent 
variable (including the constant) (Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan, 2004). 
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I cluster standard errors at area codes, see appendix 3 for a list of area codes. This account for 
the presence of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and any arbitrary correlation of the error 
terms across plants in the same area code in any given year over time. 
3.4.5 Winsorization of Variables 
Outliers are often present in a dataset giving the distribution long tails (Tukey, 1962). This is 
a problem. Instead of removing the outliers from my sample I winsorize them. Winsorizing 
means replacing the original value of an outlier with the nearest value of a more representative 
observation (Tukey, 1962). I winsorize my sample at the 2.5th and the 97.5th percentile. This 
means that values below the 2.5th percentile changes to be at the 2.5th percentile, and similar 
for observations above the 97.5th percentile. 
Figure 3-3: Winsorized ROA, 2003 – 2011. 
 
3.4.6 Regression Model 
Combining econometric issues provide me with the following regression model: 
3–11 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(Stock and Watson, 2003) 
Subscript 𝑖 refers to the observed plant and subscript 𝑡 refers to the year of observation. The 
dependent variable is yit, winzorised ROA, and X1, it to Xk, it is the explanatory variables, these 
include dummy variables After, Treatment and After x Treatment. 𝛼𝑖 is the firm fixed effects 
and 𝛿𝑡 is the year fixed effects. Finally, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term also called the idiosyncratic errors 
or idiosyncratic disturbances because these change across t as well as across i. (Wooldridge, 
2009) 
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3.5 Criticism of Empirical Method 
A concern when using ROA is that it varies across industries and is cyclical. Some industries 
carry more fixed assets than other industries and this affect the variability in ROA (Selling and 
Stickney, 1989). I need to industry-adjust ROA to account for this and to compare it across 
different industries and years. The Norwegian Corporate Account provides me with two sets 
of industry codes, 2-digit and 5-digit. To industry-adjust ROA I need to include industry year 
controls into my regression model. Using 2-digit industry codes means including 324 fixed 
variables into my regression. Alternatively, 2304 fixed variables using the 5-digit industry 
codes. 
36 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 ∗ 9 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = 324 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
256 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 ∗ 9 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = 2304 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
Unfortunately, including industry-adjusted ROA in my analysis is extensive and time-
consuming, and beyond the magnitude of this paper. Nevertheless, not using industry-adjusted 
ROA is a weakness and can bias my result. 
An important issue when clustering standard errors is to ensure a sufficiently high number of 
clusters, because it places no restriction on the correlation structure of the residuals within a 
cluster. If the number of clusters is limited then the clustered standard errors become less 
accurate and bias (Petersen, 2008). However, because of the model design and limitations on 
sample period, I only have twelve defined area codes that I cluster. According to theory is 
twelve clusters not sufficient. Ideally, it should be above hundred. As comparison, Giroud 
(2012) has around five hundred clusters. This is a weakness in my method, and consequences 
can be false significant results as standard errors are likely to be understated. 
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4 Empirical Analysis 
In this section, I present findings from my analysis and look at possible explanations. I 
introduce my analysis by discussing potential impacts of changes in infrastructure in which I 
also present an example from the opening of Eiksundtunnelen. After this, I briefly sum up my 
model before I discuss my findings. Finally, I finish the discussion and interpretation of my 
main result with a sensitivity analysis. 
4.1 Changes in Infrastructure 
Reasons for building tunnels and bridges often depend on location. In rural areas changes in 
infrastructure usually replaces ferries, dangerous stretches and roads exposed to bad weather. 
In more densely populated areas, new tunnels and bridges enhance capacity, or reroute traffic 
from already overloaded road networks.  
Historically, the majority of large road projects replaces ferries. Other reasons are making the 
infrastructure more efficient by shortening exiting roads. An example is a tunnel through a 
mountain or a bridge over a fjord, instead of the long way around. Accordingly, changes in 
infrastructure of this magnitude have substantial impact on travel time. Whilst other projects, 
not directly affecting travel time, still matter as they make the road safer and more attractive 
to drive. Examples include improvement of a road stretches, or reducing the danger of 
landslide or avalanche. Both reasons can lead to an increase in speed limits, reducing travel 
time at some extent. Finally, larger cities often suffer from insufficient capacity imposing large 
queues. Enhancing capacity reduces waiting associated with queues. This does not necessarily 
reduce travel distance it can however have great impact on travel time. 
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Figure 4-1: Reasons for building tunnels and bridges, 1992 – 2013. 
 
(Vegdirektoratet, 2014) 
Consequently, changes in infrastructure make it more attractive for headquarters to travel more 
as it becomes easier and less time-consuming. Enhancing the opportunity to monitor more 
actively and acquire information about plants. According to theory, the effect can be more 
aligned incentives as headquarters learn more about plants and its daily operations, and plant 
managers’ incentives improve. Making it more attractive for headquarters to allocate resources 
to treated plants. However, an increase in monitoring can also be destructive. Headquarters 
can monitor too much, impairing plant managers’ incentives to perform. A more serious issue 
occurs if a firm is financially constraint, and overconfident managers start to overinvest in 
plants. Instead of creating value, they potentially make the overall firm suffer as other more 
profitable plants loses resources. However, if information is symmetric and agency problems 
is absent then a change in infrastructure will not necessarily lead to increased monitoring 
(Giroud, 2012). 
4.1.1 Firms Influence on Road Projects 
If a firm has influence on changes in infrastructure, it can bias the effect on profitability from 
new projects. On the other hand, building tunnels and bridges is time consuming and often 
proceed over several years making it sensitive to economic fluctuations. Which can result in 
delays and building stops. This is because of the substantial price of constructing new road 
projects. Therefore is it unlikely that firms are able to influence much by lobbying.  
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Occasionally firms partially finance road projects or finance parts of projects to speed up the 
building process. If firms finance changes in infrastructure then any effect on profitability 
from new projects are misleading. An example is Ikea building a new warehouse in Bergen. 
The city council initially denied the project because of already insufficient capacity on E39 
and E16 passing the new location. The solution for Ikea became to finance the construction of 
a new junction on E39 and E16 (Stølås, 2010; Helgheim, Magnus, Svåsand, 2012).  
Another explanation on what can influence the building of road projects is increasing 
population. If a firm expands a plant and provide job opportunities, it can result in migration. 
Making an improvement in infrastructure more urgent. Having said that, smaller areas are 
more vulnerable for people moving away, especially young people, leaving a demand in 
workforce. The construction of road projects becomes an effort to make the village more 
available, reducing depopulation and attract workers. 
 
The following subsection provides a description of the situation before and after a change in 
infrastructure in more detail. I utilize Eiksundtunnelen as an illustrating example.  
4.1.2 An Example – Eiksundsambandet 
When Eiksundtunnelen opened in 2008, it was the deepest undersea tunnel in the world 
(Statens Vegvesen, 2008) and is the longest tunnel in my sample at 7.8 km. It replaces a ferry 
servicing the crossing between Eiksund and Rjånes connecting the island municipalities 
Hareid, Herøy, Sande and Ulstein to the mainland in southern Møre and Romsdal, more 
specifically to Ørsta and Volda. The construction took five years and when it opened, it 
reduceing travel time with 30 minutes between the islands and the mainland (Båtevik, 
Dvergsdal and Krumsvik, 2012; Ulstein et al., 2014). The motivation for building the tunnel 
was to reduce travel time, an effect of reduced travel distance. Moreover, the expectations for 
the new mainland connection were positive impact on flexibility in both the labor market and 
business community (Ulstein et al., 2014). 
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Figure 4-2: Map of Eiksundtunnelen. 
 
Situation Before Eikesundtunnelen 
Before the tunnel opened, travelers depended on ferries servicing the mainland connection. 
Ferries are generally not a very efficient means of transportation as they follow a fixed time 
schedule and often have infrequent departures, especially at evenings and nights. Moreover, 
capacity constriction imposes uncertainty associated with being included on the first departure. 
During rush hours, at the beginning and end of a workday, this uncertainty is more severe and 
travelers need to calculate extra time to ensure a place on the preferred ferry departure. 
Accordingly, depending on a ferry implies waiting in queue both at the pier, and when 
boarding and leaving the ferry. Before Eiksundtunnelen opened, it took approximately 72 
minutes to drive from Fosnavåg to Volda (Båtevik, Dvergsdal and Krumsvik, 2012).  
Little flexibility puts constraint on travelers and impede personal and cargo transport for 
industries. A consequence are that expanding industries in the islands municipalities find it 
difficult to attract qualified workforce, partly because of the nonexistent mainland connection 
(Ulstein et al., 2014). Signals from industries to move large future investments away from the 
Eiksund region became an important factor in the decision to build the mainland connection 
(Ulstein et al., 2014). 
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Figure 4-3: Eiksundsambandet – travel route before and after tunnel. 
 
Note to figure 4-3: The dashed line marked (3) represents Eiksundtunnelen. The total red line represents new 
road built in connection with the tunnel. The entire road is 14.9 km (Statens Vegvesen, 2008). 
Description of Situation After 
When Eiksundtunnelen opened, the ferry shut down. Several advantages came with the new 
mainland connection, such as more flexibility, open at night, and no more imposed waiting. 
After the new road opened the drive from Fosnavåg to Volda is reduced to 45 minutes 
(Båtevik, Dvergsdal and Krumsvik, 2012), a 30 minutes reduction. Another explanation to 
travel time reduction can be increased speed limits due to improved roads. However, Ulstein 
et al. (2014) find that the travel time reduction is solely a result of the construction of Eiksund 
connection. 
The effective travel time reduction for personal transport between the island municipalities 
and the mainland municipals can be seen in table 4-1. While table 4-2 shows the total travel 
time reduction for personal transport. See appendix 4 for calculation and assumptions behind 
total travel time reduction. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that travel time reduction 
is less significant for cargo transport due to the steep slope of 9.8 % in Eiksundtunnelen (Store 
norske leksikon, 2005 – 2007), which is likely to reduce velocity for heavier vehicles. 
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Table 4-1: Effective travel time reduction, from 2006 to 2011. 
 
Note to table 4-1: The effective travel time consist of time driving and time spent on ferry, excluding additional 
waiting. The reduction in travel time is more extensive to Volda due to larger reduction in travel distance, as 
travelers no longer need to drive through Ørsta (Ulstein et al., 2014). 
Table 4-2: Total travel time reduction, from 2006 to 2011. 
 
Note to table 4-2: Total reduction in travel time including waiting at pier, when boarding, and when leaving the 
ferry (Ulstein et al., 2014). 
Local industries have found it easier to recruit employees after the tunnel opened. The labor 
market is affected in both size and flexibility. Consequently, industries are more productive 
(Ulstein et al., 2014). 
Traffic between the islands and the mainland increased when Eiksundtunnelen opened. Annual 
daily traffic (ADT) shows a considerable increase after the connection opened in 2008. Statens 
Vegvesen (2008) forecasted a growth rate in traffic of 30 % the opening year and 1 % 
thereafter.  In reality, ADT almost doubled. Increased personal traffic explains most of the 
growth. On the other hand, cargo traffic has also increased, but its magnitude is less substantial 
compared to personal traffic, although the growth is actually higher. The growth in cargo 
traffic is 148% compared to 83 % growth in personal traffic. However, the large number in 
cargo traffic after 2008 is likely to be bias as it also includes cars with trailers. The real increase 
in traffic of heavier vehicles are probably lower. Heavier vehicles faces challenges with the 
steep slope inside Eiksundtunnelen, making it more attractive to utilize other connections 
when possible (Ulstein et al., 2014). See appendix 5 for ADT data. 
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Figure 4-4: Development in ADT data from personal and total traffic – 
Eiksundtunnelen. 
 
(Statens Vegvesen, 2014; Statens Vegvesen) 
Figure 4-5: Development in ADT data from cargo transport – 
Eiksundtunnelen. 
 
Note to figure 4-5: Cargo after 2008 include all vehicles > 5.6 meter. This include cars with trailers in addition 
to cargo transport (Statens Vegvesen, 2014; Statens Vegvesen). 
4.2 Main Results 
In this section, I present the findings of my analysis. First, I explain the model including 
potential problems. I then move on to the result and provide a discussion of my findings. 
4.2.1 Choice of Variables 
In my analysis, I investigate how the opening of road projects affect plant-level profitability, 
and employees. I follow the method used by Giroud (2012), but I use different variables. 
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Giroud (2012) studied the effect from new airline routes on plant-level production and 
investments by implementing difference-in-differences estimation. By using difference-in-
differences estimation on ROA, I measure the effect of both operating and investments 
performance. ROA is winsorized to remove extreme outliers not representative to the sample. 
In addition to ROA, I also study the effect from projects on the number of employees at plant-
level.  
Fixed Effects 
My regression model include both firm- and year-fixed effects to remove potential changes in 
ROA instigated by the plant or year. It is natural to assume that there exists both firm and year 
effects on ROA not caused by a plant’s properties.  
The year-fixed effects explain much of the variation in ROA in the sample period. Hence, 
removing such effects are important because influence from historical events can contaminate 
the result. An example is the recent financial crisis. Despite its impact, I chose to remove the 
year-fixed effects from the following result table to make the table more presentable. The 
entire result included the year-fixed effects is presented in appendix 6. 
Industry Sectors 
In my analysis, I include plants within industry groups of primary industry, oil, gas and mining, 
manufacturing, energy, and construction from the classification SN2007 (Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå, 2014; European Commission, 2010). As comparison, Giroud (2012) only include 
manufacturing industry. However, Norway is a small country and to ensure I have enough 
observations I chose to include a broader specter of industries. 
Potential Problems 
Two potential problems are the occurrence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
Heteroskedasticity means that the error terms is not constant, which leads to underestimated 
standard errors. If the error terms correlates across time then serial correlation is present, which 
often is the case with difference-in-differences analysis. I solve both issues by clustering 
standard errors at area codes. 
Time Period 
My sample include tunnels and bridges that opened during a three-year period from 2006 to 
2008. However, not equally spread out over the years. In fact, most of the tunnels and bridges 
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in my sample opened in 2008. In addition to run the regression on the entire period, I also run 
it on projects opening in 2008.  
Figure 4-6: Opening year of tunnels and bridges. 
 
(Vegdirektoratet, 2014) 
4.2.2 Regression Result 
The coefficient of interest is After x Treatment, it tells the effect from opening a new tunnel or 
bridge on plant-level ROA, and employees. 
Table 4-3: Regression results. 
 
25 %
8 %67 %
Projects opened in 2006
Projects opened in 2007
Projects opened in 2008
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Projects Opening in 2006 - 2008 
In the first regression, I include tunnels and bridges opening in 2006 through 2008. Column 1 
shows the regression on ROA in this period. I find that changes in infrastructure opening 
during this period increase profitability with 4.3 %. However, the result is not statistically 
significant. Meaning that I cannot conclude that this is the effect on ROA from the projects. I 
also note that none of the other explanatory variables is significant, except the constant.  
In column 2, I show the regression on employees. It shows the effect from changes in 
infrastructure on the number of employees at treated plants. I find an increase in employees of 
2.5 persons. However, this result is not statistical significant, hence I cannot conclude that this 
is the effect from the projects. The same applies for the other explanatory variables except the 
constant. 
Projects Opening in 2008 
The third and fourth column in table 4-3 show the effect on ROA and employees, respectively, 
when I only include changes in infrastructure opening in 2008. From the regression on ROA, 
I find that newly opened projects increase plant-level profitability with 11.4 %. Moreover, this 
result is statistically significant. Consequently, I can conclude that this is the effect from 
opening of road projects.  
The last column contains the regression on employees for projects opening in 2008. I find that 
employees increase with 6.27 persons due to new projects. This result is also statistically 
significant. Hence, I can conclude that this increase is an effect of project openings.  
Later I perform a sensitivity analysis on the effect on ROA using changes in infrastructure 
opening in 2008. This analysis reveals if the opening of projects in 2008 drives the effect on 
ROA, or if the effect is from other factors. In the reminder, I base my analysis on results from 
the regressions containing projects opening in 2008. 
4.2.3 Effect on ROA 
My findings show a positive effect on plant-level ROA for Norwegian firms from 
improvements in proximity, due to openings of changes in infrastructure during 2008. This is 
in analogy with the findings from Giroud (2012) on plant-level data in the United States, and 
findings from other studies on the effect and advantages of proximity. 
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Financial theory states that an increase in ROA indicates a firm succeeding in allocating its 
assets optimally to generate profit. According to theory on agency problems and corporate 
governance, this implies that improved proximity increases monitoring and information 
acquiring. Resulting in increased resource allocation from headquarters, and a change in 
incentives by plant managers as interests align more. 
A problem with this explanation of the effect on ROA from road projects, in my model, is that 
I cannot separate personal transport from transport of goods. Tunnels and bridges are normally 
built high and wide enough for cargo transport to pass. Accordingly, the effect on plant-level 
performance can be a result of increased transport of equipment and products to and from 
plants, instead of increased monitoring from headquarters. Annual daily traffic (ADT) 
provides information about the development in personal and cargo traffic. However, ADT data 
on Eiksundtunnelen showed a considerable increase both in personal and cargo transport. 
Although it can provide an indication on what causes the effect on profitability, it is not 
sufficient to draw any conclusions. Hence, one need to be careful with explaining the effect 
on ROA as an outcome of increased in monitoring and information acquiring. 
Changes in infrastructure can increase tourism and through traffic after a new road project 
opens, especially when it replaces a ferry. Increase in tourism and through traffic can lead to 
increased sales, and increased profitability. However, the industries in my dataset is not 
sensitive to increases in tourism or through traffic, typical industries that are more likely 
affected is retail businesses, hotels, restaurants etc. This strengthens the hypothesis that the 
effect on ROA is from either increased monitoring or cargo transport. 
4.2.4 Analysis of Other Factors That Can Affect ROA 
A concern in my dataset is that the inclusion of the construction industry, more specifically 
construction of tunnels and bridges, drive the effect on ROA from opening of road projects. 
As the entrepreneurs have current costs, they  receive consecutive payments. If this drive ROA, 
I should potentially find a negative effect from the opening of projects as the entrepreneurs 
income ceases. I find no such effect in my regression result. 
I chose areas of postal codes within a reasonable travel time to drive. The option of alternative 
transport as airplanes, train or boat within the area is not considered. Accordingly, other means 
of transportation can be preferred. An important assumption in my analysis is that managers 
choose the travel route that minimizes travel time. If alternative transportations is optimal, 
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then the opening a road project has no influence on incentives to monitor more frequent. 
Moreover, not utilizing the project should underestimate its effect on ROA. 
Changes in local business markets can drive the effect on ROA. A plausible effect of changes 
in infrastructure, especially in a more remote area with larger distances, is that entrepreneurs 
and artisans expanding their business market. As it becomes easier to travel, they are able to 
accept orders in previously unavailable areas. This can result in increased profitability due to 
newly opened changes in infrastructure. Moreover, local firms can also suffer from increased 
competition. Subsequently this can reduce the effect on ROA. 
Road projects take several years to construct before they are finished and opens. However, 
sometimes parts of a project open sooner allowing travelers to utilize it. This can lead to an 
improvement in proximity. If ROA is affected then my findings are understated. Although 
parts of a new road may open earlier, travelers cannot use the road as intended until the entire 
project is finished. In addition, early opened parts are often only just passable because of 
ongoing construction work that for example can impose waiting. Accordingly, I should find 
no effect on ROA from partially early openings. 
4.2.5 Effect on Employees 
My findings show a positive effect on plant-level employees for firms in my dataset from 
changes in infrastructure during 2008. 
If a change in infrastructure leads to an increase in employees this can signal increased 
resource allocation from headquarters. Improved proximity to plants enhance headquarters 
ability to monitor more, this can potentially reveal a demand for additional workforce. 
Especially if markets are expanding and the competition increases. Alternatively, investments 
in new technology or equipment can force companies to hire skilled personnel. Conversely, 
growth in employees is unlikely to come from increased cargo transport, implying that 
personal transport causes the effect. This is in analogy with both expanding markets and 
increased monitoring from headquarters. 
4.2.6 Analysis of Other Factors That Can Affect Employees 
As with ROA, an increase in employees is improbable to come from construction work 
regarding the road project. If this is a source to an increase in employees then the effect had 
been prior to the opening, during the building period, and not after. It is plausible that 
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construction firms hire extra personnel to finish a project, but when finished, the extra 
personnel is redundant. Especially since contractor contracts often only extend until the project 
is finished. If construction work have had an effect on ROA, I should find a decrease in 
employees. 
4.2.7 Heterogeneity 
A problem in Giroud’s (2012) study is exposure to substantial heterogeneity. Findings show a 
stronger treatment effect when headquarters are more time-constraint, which is consistent with 
theory of monitoring and information acquiring being time demanding activities. To measure 
if headquarters are time-constraint Giroud (2012) divide headquarter employees by the 
number of plants. However, the number of treatments in my dataset are few, making it difficult 
to divide the group equally into time-constraint and non-time-constraint. Subsequently this 
calculation is vulnerable to headquarters with a high number of employees. As a result most 
of the headquarters in my dataset is considered time-constraint. Accordingly, the effect on 
plant-level ROA is unchanged when I only include plants with time-constraint headquarters. 
Another heterogeneity issue is developments in information technology that reduces the need 
for personal travel to monitor. Giroud (2012) finds a stronger effect from treatment in earlier 
years when innovations in for example internet and video conferencing were less extensive. 
As my dataset is narrow, it only includes three years of treatments. Therefore, substantial 
changes in information technology are unlikely to affect treatment effect differently within 
these years. 
4.3 Placebo Analysis 
As a sensitivity analysis, I do a placebo test. This analysis shows the effect on ROA if tunnels 
and bridges opens in a different year. I use the same method as described under the main 
analysis. The regression is a difference-in-differences estimation including both firm- and 
year-fixed effects. I also cluster standard errors at area codes to account for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Further, I only include changes in infrastructure 
opening in 2008. Each regression only includes two years of data, one year before treatment 
and one year after treatment. 
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Table 4-4: Regression results of sensitivity analysis. 
 
Similar to prior regression analysis’, the factor of interest is After x Treatment, which shows 
the effect on ROA from road projects. The effect of After x Treatment should be close to zero 
for other years than 2008. Indicating no effect on ROA from the road projects in years before 
or after the actual opening.  
I find that most of the explanatory variables are significant in all regressions. Noteworthy is 
After x Treatment not being statistically significant in column two and five, thus I cannot 
conclude that the effect on ROA from projects is correct for these years. In addition, other 
variables are also not significant or omitted. This weakens the reliability of the placebo 
analysis and its impact on my main result. Nevertheless, the effect on ROA from road projects 
is significant for most years.  
Findings in the main analysis show an increase in ROA of 11.4 % from road projects. If other 
factors drive this increase, the placebo analysis reveals it. More specifically, I should find that 
the coefficient After x Treatment is large and significant in years prior and posterior to 2008. 
Additionally, its magnitude should be similar to findings when treatment actually occurs. I 
find no evidence of such effects, neither prior nor posterior to treatment. 
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Figure 4-7: Effect on ROA from opening of a new tunnel or bridge. 
 
The absence of effects on ROA prior and posterior to treatment in 2008 suggest that the effect 
found on ROA in the main analysis is specific to the year 2008, when changes in infrastructure 
occurred. This indicates that the effect on ROA solely comes from projects and not from other 
factors such as partially opened projects, the inclusion of construction industry in my dataset, 
or the expansion of markets and increased competition. 
A comparison of ROA in control group and treatment group shows the effect of changes in 
infrastructure allotted to treated firms. The figure shows that ROA in the control group have 
been stable both before and after 2008, but has experienced a reduction after road projects 
opened. Moreover, the treatment group has experienced the opposite. Negative coefficients 
from Treatment prior to 2008 result in negative ROA. However, after the projects open ROA 
increases and stabilizes. Because of several non-significant coefficients one need to be careful 
to interpreting the result of this analysis. 
Figure 4-8: Placebo analysis - comparison of control group and treatment 
group. 
 
Note: The graph plots the regression result. ROA is calculated using before numbers for 2005 and after for the 
remaing years. See appendix 7 for calculations. 
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I have only done a sensitivity analysis on ROA, because of the missing observations on 
employees in 2006 and 2007. Employees are estimated for these years, accordingly it is not 
plausible that a sensitivity analysis provides any additional insights.  
4.4 Limitations 
Throughout this paper, I have made many assumptions and simplifications. These are potential 
weaknesses and can affect my result. 
A weakness in my analysis is that the design of my model and limitations in the dataset leave 
me with only a few area codes to cluster. Consequently, the clustered standard errors is likely 
to be underestimated, which could result in overestimated test statistics and a false significant 
result. A solution to this problem is to include more road projects into the sample, increasing 
the number of area codes. Nonetheless, I recognize that more area codes give a more reliable 
and accurate result. 
The identification of suitable area codes comes from reasoning, and constitutes the largest 
uncertainty in my dataset and model. Accordingly, the established area codes are not the only 
possible combination of postal codes. They may not even represent optimal areas. This implies 
that a dissimilar reasoning and other assumptions ends up with other sets of areas made from 
postal codes. Moreover, it can change the result of the analysis, and potentially find a stronger 
or a weaker effect on ROA. 
Excluding industry-adjusted return on assets is another limitation in this paper. ROA is 
cyclical and varies a lot across different industries. Including industry-adjusted ROA, remove 
these effects. I recognize that inclusion of industry-adjusted ROA could improve the quality 
and accuracy of my results. 
Missing observations on employees in 2006 and 2007 instigate a weakness in my regression 
analysis. A limited sample period forces me to estimate the number of employees for these 
years in order to do my analysis. This can potentially bias my result and give a wrong effect 
from changes in infrastructure on employees. 
Another problem with my model is that it cannot separate personal traffic from cargo traffic, 
as I cannot exclude cargo traffic from my analysis. This have implications on the interpretation 
of my analysis because of uncertainty surrounding the effect on ROA and employees from 
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treatment. On one hand, it can be a result of managers traveling more often and on the other 
hand a result of increased transport of products and equipment. 
4.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
My analysis only include nine years of plant-level observations and five industry sectors. A 
more profound study can be to include more plant-year observations, maybe look at different 
industries or a broader specter of industries. Another interesting angle can be a similar study 
on alternative transportation in Norway. 
The design of my model cannot separate personal traffic and cargo traffic. Hence, it would be 
interesting to investigate what actually causes the effect from changes in infrastructure. 
Whether it is increased personal traffic or because of increased cargo traffic to and from the 
plant. Alternatively, a combination of both.  
If increased plant-level profitability is not an outcome of increased personal traffic, then an 
idea can be to investigate reasons for increased cargo traffic.  It can also be interesting to do 
research on whether increased personal traffic reflects more frequent monitoring by 
headquarters, or if it reflects something else, e.g. expanding markets, increased competition. 
Finally, I only study the effects of changes in infrastructure on plant-level data. It can therefore 
be interesting to study how increased plant-level profitability affects the entire firm.  
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate the effect of changes in infrastructure on plant-level performance. 
I examine the profitability measure return on assets and in addition, I study the effect on 
employees.  
Conducting a difference-in-differences analysis with firm- and year-fixed effects, and 
clustered standard errors, I find the effect on ROA from changes in infrastructure. In the period 
from 2006 to 2008 I find a positive effect on plant-level ROA and employees, but 
unfortunately not significant. The same approach indicates a statistically significant effect on 
plant-level ROA and employees when I only use projects opening in 2008. Specifically, I find 
that plant-level ROA increase with 11.4 % and employees increase with 6.2 persons due to the 
changes in infrastructure. 
It is difficult to conclude on what drives the effect found on profitability. Since my model 
cannot separate personal and cargo traffic, it is difficult to exclude transport of goods and 
equipment as the potential driver. However, there are strong indications implying that the 
effect come from either increased cargo transport, increased monitoring or expanding markets. 
This can indicate better allocation of resources as an effect of changes in infrastructure. 
Moreover, combining the effect from changes in infrastructure on ROA and on employees 
indicates that the found effect is more likely a result of increased personal transport, 
monitoring or expanding business markets, rather than increased cargo transport. Keeping in 
mind the weakness in computation of the effect on employees, one need to be careful to draw 
a conclusion based on the combination of the two regression results. 
Findings from the placebo analysis indicate no evidence of potential effects on ROA, from 
other factors than projects opening in 2008, contaminating my regression result. This support 
my previous findings and conclusion that changes in infrastructure increase plant-level 
profitability. 
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6 Appendix 
Appendix 1: Road Projects 
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Appendix 2: Industry Sectors, SN 2002 & SN 2007 
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Appendix 3: Areas of Postal Codes 
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Appendix 4: Travel Time Reduction in Eiksundtunnelen 
Ulstein et al. (2014) define the ferry crossing between Eiksund and Rjånes as urban and 
assume that most of the traffic is local. Moreover, waiting at pier constitute a quarter of the 
departure frequency. If the crossing is not considered urban, the estimated waiting increase to 
half of the departure frequency. 
 
(Ulstein et al., 2014) 
This is a considerable reduction in travel time on a relatively short travel distance between the 
islands, and Ørsta and Volda. 
Moreover, scarcity capacity on ferry leads to queues that increases waiting time beyond what 
account for in these calculations. Ulstein et al. (2014) finds that this often is the case at rush 
hours on the ferry crossing Eiksund – Rjåneset. 
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Appendix 5: ADT Data Eiksundtunnelen 
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Appendix 6: Complete Regression Results 
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Appendix 7: Sensitivity Analysis - Calculation of ROA 
 
 
 
